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 Nearly 5 years after the United States invaded 
Iraq, the tremors from this cataclysmic event are still 
reverberating in the region and around the world. A 
new generation of jihadist extremists is gaining 
experience on the battlefields of Iraq, and what passes 
for political authority seems increasingly wielded 
by nonstate groups via the point of a gun. All the 
surrounding states view developments in Iraq with 
varying levels of disquiet. Many commentators believe 
that the invasion has become the most important 
regional event framing political and military affairs 
since the 1967 Six-Day War. The war has dramatically 
altered internal political dynamics throughout the 
region, placing the regimes and their historically close 
relations with the United States under new pressures. 
All these forces are converging to frame a new strategic 
challenge to the United States and the international 
community, which has vital economic and political 
interests in ensuring regional stability and security. 
The World Economic Forum, for example, recently 
identified geopolitical instability in the Middle East as 
a separate and distinct threat to global stability. 
 This monograph attempts to peel back the layers of 
complexity surrounding the regional threat environ-
ment as a first step in the process of constructing a 
security strategy that can effectively mitigate the threats 
to U.S. and global interests. The United States has relied 
on a remarkably effective Cold War template to protect 
and preserve its regional interests that includes such 
elements as access to host nation facilities, preposition-
ed military equipment, foreign military sales, and 
joint training and exercises. The question facing 
strategists is whether this template remains relevant 
to the regional environment. The author argues that 
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changing internal political dynamics throughout the 
region will make it increasingly difficult for regional 
elites to continue to allow the United States to apply 
its tried and true Cold War template. He argues that 
the United States must come to terms with the altered 
regional environment in the aftermath of the Iraq 
invasion and conduct a strategic net assessment that 
will measure the ability of its national instruments 
of power to protect and preserve national and global 
interests.
 This monograph furthers the Strategic Studies 
Institute’s continued and abiding interest in promoting 
discourse on how to tailor means to ends as part of the 
process of building successful strategy in this critical 
region. The analysis presented will reinforce those 
arguing for a more holistic view of strategy and of the 
strategic environment in which internal and external 
factors are inextricably intertwined. Boundaries 
between external and internal threats are increasingly 
blurred around the world, including the Middle East. 
Strategists need to come to grips with these complexities 
as the nation deliberates upon applying its instruments 
of power around the world in pursuit of its objectives. 
This monograph will lead serious students of strategy 
down some unwelcome paths, but confronting these 
labyrinthine challenges is the vital and first step in 
building successful strategy and policy.
 
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute 
vBIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR
JAMES A. RUSSELL is managing editor of Strategic 
Insights, the bi-monthly e-journal published by the 
Center for Contemporary Conflict at the Naval Post-
graduate School (NPS) in Monterey, California. He also 
serves as senior lecturer in the Department of National 
Security Affairs at NPS, where he teaches courses on 
Middle East security affairs, terrorism, and national 
security strategy. From 1988 to 2001, Mr. Russell held 
a variety of positions in the Office of the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 
Near East South Asia. During this period, he traveled 
extensively in the Persian Gulf and Middle East working 
on U.S. security policy. His articles and commentaries 
have appeared in the Philadelphia Inquirer, San Jose 
Mercury News, Security and Terrorism Research Bulletin, 
World Defence Systems, Middle East Policy, Cambridge 
Review of International Affairs, Comparative Strategy, 
International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Middle 
East Review of International Affairs, Joint Force Quarterly, 
Naval War College Review, Nonproliferation Review, and 
Contemporary Security Policy. His latest article, “Whither 
Regional Security In a World Turned Upside Down?” 
appeared in the Summer 2007 issue of Middle East Policy. 
He is the editor of WMD Proliferation in the Middle East: 
Directions and Policy Options in the New Century and 
Critical Issues Facing the Middle East: Security, Politics, 
and Economics (New York: Palgrave/MacMillan, 2006). 
Mr. Russell holds a B.A. from Franklin and Marshall 
College and an M.A. from the University of Pittsburgh 
and is currently completing his doctoral dissertation 





 Like the Arab-Israeli  Six-Day War of 1967, the 
U.S. invasion of Iraq is fundamentally reordering 
regional politics and security in ways that will be felt 
for a generation, if not longer.1 The Pandora’s Box 
opened by the United States in Iraq adds a new level of 
unwelcome complexity to an already strained regional 
fabric. Threats to regional security stem from global, 
interstate, and intrastate sources. The complicated, 
multidimensional, and interrelated natures of these 
threats suggest that the United States must reassess 
strategy and policy if it is to protect and further its 
regional interests. The objective of this monograph is 
threefold: (1) deconstruct the threats to regional secur-
ity and stability in the aftermath of the Iraq invasion; 
(2) determine whether U.S. strategy is tailored to the 
threat environment; and (3) suggest steps that can be 
taken to bring strategy and the environment into closer 
alignment. 
 Such a process runs counter to the current defense 
planning methodology paradigm used by the Defense 
Department. Both the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review 
and its predecessor released just after the September 
11, 2001 (9/11) attacks called for the divorce of U.S. 
strategy and defense planning from specific regional 
threats and contingencies. Instead, the planning 
documents called for the development of “capabilities 
portfolios” to enable U.S. military forces to fight in a 
series of different operational environments: irregular 
warfare against nonstate actors, traditional interstate 
warfare, catastrophic attacks using weapons of mass 
destruction, and disruptive attacks from adversaries 
using cyber-warfare or other advanced technologies. 
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 This monograph argues that the United States needs 
to reconnect its strategy, policy, and defense planning 
to regional environments if it is to have any hope of 
mitigating threats to its interests, not just in the Middle 
East, but around the world.
 The altered distribution of power has changed the 
nature of the security dilemma for regional states—the 
critical structural dynamic in interstate interactions and 
the engine driving the region’s geopolitical instability. 
The security dilemma refers to a term of art from the 
international relations theory of realism, which argues 
that states are primarily motivated by self-interest and 
exist in an anarchical, self-help system. The modern 
form of realism, the so-called “neo-realist” paradigm 
developed by Kenneth Waltz, holds that actions taken 
by states to protect and enhance their security create 
in turn insecurity for surrounding states that causes 
states to balance and counterbalance each other in a 
never-ending cycle.2 Under this theory, the security 
dilemma of states and the relative distribution of power 
in the international system are a structural dynamic 
that governs interstate interactions. States pursue 
security through a combination of arms buildups and 
political-military relationships with other strong states 
in alliances. Pursuit of nuclear weapons—the putative 
ultimate guarantor of state security—and/or nuclear 
partners is explained under realist theory as a logical 
result of states’ quest for security. That quest for security 
is operationalized by states’ political leadership using 
a rational decisionmaking process that apportions 
available resources to meet the security needs of the 
state.
 The altered security regional dilemma and the 
region’s changing nuclear posture must be framed in 
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the context of changing internal political dynamics—
another of the structural features causing regional 
geopolitical instability. The unfolding Hamas-
Palestinian Authority conflict in the Occupied Terri-
tories provides an apt metaphor of the broader internal 
struggles for power unfolding across the region in 
which the discredited ruling elites are searching for 
a formula to accommodate the rising power of the 
Islamists while preserving their own hold on power. 
Upsetting the apple cart of Iraqi politics comes at a time 
of regional generational transition, with the corpses of 
discredited secular dictatorships and monarchies still 
littering the regional political landscape.
 The United States confronts the altered regional 
security environment with a strategy that remains 
rooted in its Cold War experience which featured 
collective defense arrangements backed by security 
guarantees, forward military presence, and strong 
U.S.–host nation military relations. In order to mitigate 
threats to regional security, the United States must first 
come to grips with the linkages between the intrastate, 
interstate, and global environments in the region. With 
the linkages established, the threats to regional security 
and stability as suggested in the Davos Forum’s formu-
lation make perfect sense: geopolitical instability, 
energy supply disruptions, weapons proliferation, 
and international terrorism. To contain these threats, 
the United States must reconnect its security strategy 
to the regional environment, recognizing that it cannot 
simply apply “capabilities portfolios” to complex 
political and military problems bounded by history 
and regional circumstances. The analysis presented 
here suggests that state behavior in the region is the 
product of an altered security dilemma, in which 
xinternal political pressures are discouraging regional 
states from entrusting responsibility for their strategic 
security to outside powers, and instead are moving 
them to redirect their security efforts inward.
 The United States needs to undertake a strategic 
regional net assessment as it seeks to construct a 
regional security strategy to protect its interests and 
mitigate wider threats to international security. That 
net assessment should include (1) reviewing the role 
of security guarantees in promoting regional stability, 
an acknowledgment of the contradictory nature of 
the interstate and intrastate threats and tensions; and 
(2) the negative impact that the U.S. obsession with 
force protection is having on its ability to effectively 
implement strategy on the ground.
ENDNOTES
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1REGIONAL THREATS AND SECURITY 
STRATEGY:
THE TROUBLING CASE OF TODAY’S 
MIDDLE EAST
 
 In September 2002, Arab League Secretary General 
Amr Moussa presciently warned that the “gates of 
hell” would open if the United States invaded Iraq. Not 
heeding his warning, the United States emphatically 
ripped those gates from their hinges in March 2003, 
and the entire region now sits precariously wedged 
just inside the entrance staring into the inferno. Indeed, 
the entire world is feeling the heat.
  From Baghdad, Najaf, and Kirkuk to such far-flung 
places as Beirut and Tripoli in Lebanon to Mogadishu, 
the Gaza Strip, and Manama, the region is ablaze with 
the politics of contention. In this debate, the AK-47, 
explosively formed projectiles, improvised explosive 
devices, suicide bombers, sectarian death squads, and 
rocket-propelled grenades serve as the preferred means 
of communication. Around the world, the Iraq war 
shimmers on televisions and computer screens, serving 
as the Sunni-extremist equivalent of the Jerry Lewis 
telethon, pouring money into al Qai’da’s coffers and 
providing a steady stream of recruits ready to throw 
themselves and their innocent victims into the flames 
of hell’s inferno. The suicide bombers of Iraq have 
emboldened and reenergized al Qai’da’s franchised 
global operations, urged on by their spiritual leaders, 
Ayman Al-Zawahiri and Osama bin Laden, operating 
from established sanctuaries in the border regions of 
Afghanistan and Pakistan.1 
 Like the Arab-Israeli Six-Day War in 1967, the U.S. 
invasion of Iraq is fundamentally reordering regional 
politics and security in ways that will be felt for a 
2generation, if not longer.2 The Pandora’s Box opened 
by the United States in Iraq adds new and unwelcome 
complexity to a geopolitical environment already roiled 
by traditional stresses. Threats to regional security 
stem from global, interstate, and intrastate sources. 
The complicated multidimensional and interrelated 
natures of these threats suggest that the United States 
must now reassess present strategy and policy if it is to 
protect and further its regional interests. The objective 
of this monograph is threefold: (1) deconstruct the 
threats to regional security and stability in the aftermath 
of the Iraq invasion; (2) determine whether present 
U.S. strategy is tailored to the newly emerged threat 
environment; and (3) suggest steps that can be taken to 
bring strategy and the threat environment into closer 
alignment. 
 Such a process runs counter to the current planning 
model used by the Defense Department. Both the 2006 
Quadrennial Defense Review and its predecessor released 
just after the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks call for 
the divorce of U.S. strategy and defense planning from 
specific regional threats and contingencies.3 Instead, 
the planning documents call for the development of 
“capabilities portfolios” to enable U.S. military forces to 
fight in a series of different operational environments: 
irregular warfare against nonstate actors, traditional 
interstate warfare, and responses to catastrophic 
attacks with weapons of mass destruction or disruptive 
attacks from adversaries using cyber-warfare or other 
advanced technologies.4 This monograph argues that 
the United States needs to reconnect its strategy, policy, 
and defense planning to regional environments if it is 
to have any hope of countering threats to its interests, 
not just in the Middle East but around the world.
3The Road to Nowhere—Or Down to the Crossroads?
 The United States today finds itself in a period 
of profound strategic confusion and weariness as it 
sifts through the rubble of the last 6 years of conflict, 
searching for clues as to what went wrong and how 
to restore its position of global leadership. Nowhere is 
the rubble as high, deep, and quickly accummulating 
as in the Middle East. Public opinion polling from 2006 
has found that nearly 70 percent of the regional public 
regards the United States and Israel as the principal 
threats to regional security.5 The same polling data 
indicated that Lebanese Hezbollah leader Hassan 
Nasrallah has become the most popular leader in the 
Middle East.6 Where a decade ago the United States 
could reasonably be said to exert preponderant 
influence throughout regional capitals, today’s regimes 
look upon their association with the United States as 
a regrettable but necessary evil and are anxious to 
demonstrate their independence from Washington, 
regarding such a stance as a matter of political 
survival.
 A legitimate question for strategists is whether 
the United States should even be concerned about 
threats to the security of the Persian Gulf and the 
Middle East. Noted strategic analyst Edward Luttwak 
recently argued that the Middle East is irrelevant to 
global affairs and hence is undeserving of sustained 
attention by the U.S. Government and the international 
community.7 Luttwak reasons that: (1) the Arab-Israeli 
dispute has lost its strategic significance and is now 
largely a local quarrel; (2) regional military threats are 
not substantial; (3) Middle Eastern societies are not 
amenable to political change and hence are best left 
alone by outside powers; and (4) the region is stagnant 
4economically and culturally, badly lagging behind 
the world in most development indicators.8 Luttwak 
therefore concludes: “Unless compelled by immediate 
danger, we should therefore focus on the old and new 
lands of creation in Europe and America, in India and 
East Asia—places where hard-working populations 
are looking ahead instead of dreaming of the past.”9 
 While deserving of serious thought, Luttwak’s 
argument is rejected in most quarters. In early 2007, 
for example, the World Economic Forum reported 
23 core global risks to the international community 
over the next decade, the thrust being that the Middle 
East remains central to global stability. Not only does 
the report include “Middle East Instability” as its 
own unique risk to global security, it also identifies 
numerous other salient threats that point to the 
region’s central importance: potential disruptions in 
world energy supplies, proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD), the spread of international 
terrorism, the U.S. current account deficit, access to 
fresh water, retrenchment from globalization, and state 
collapse through civil wars (see Figure 1).
 The unsurprising implication of the World 
Economic Forum’s report is that countering the risks 
to security in the Middle East is critical to preserving 
global stability. In a follow-on report specifically 
addressing regional issues, the World Economic Forum 
and the Gulf Research Center identified several critical 
regional trends with adverse global implications.10 
The report noted: “The Middle East is a focal point 
for global risk and its mitigation. This is particularly 
clear with geopolitical risk—with a high concentration 
of destabilizing geopolitical events having their origin 
in the wider Middle Eastern Region.”11 The report 
highlights a number of particularly critical threats to 
global security emanating from the region:
5Economic
•  Oil price shock/energy supply 
interruptions
•  U.S. current account deficit/fall 
in value of $
•  Chinese economic hard landing
•  Fiscal crises caused by 
demographic shifts










•  Proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD)
• Interstate and civil wars
•  Transnational crime and 
corruption
•  Retrenchment from 
globalization
• Middle East instability
Societal
• Pandemics
•  Infectious disease in 
developing world




•  Breakdown in critical 
information infrastructure
•  Emergence of risks associated 
with nanotechnology
Source: Global Risks 2007: A Global Risk Network Report, World 
Economic Forum: Geneva 2007.
Figure 1.  World Economic Forum “Core” Global 
Risks.12
 • Oil price shocks or energy supply disruptions. 
Oil producers in the Middle East must steadily 
increase production over the next decade and 
beyond if world oil markets are to remain in a 
rough supply-demand balance and keep pricing 
in a predictable range. The International Energy 
Agency forecasts an inexorable growth in global 
demand for oil from 84 million barrels per day 
in 2005 to 116 million barrels per day by 2030.13 
As non-Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
6Countries (OPEC) suppliers reach a production 
plateau by 2020, oil and natural gas production 
will be overwhelmingly concentrated in a few 
states, most which are located in the Middle 
East. The Middle East’s share of global oil 
production is projected to grow from 35 percent 
in 2004 to 44 percent by 2030.14 The health of the 
world’s economy will increasingly depend on 
predictable production increases by Gulf state 
oil and gas producers to ensure the orderly 
functioning of world energy markets. Political 
stability which creates a favorable investment 
climate throughout the region is an important 
underlying structural factor that will allow this 
process to move forward. Regional geopolitical 
instability that interferes with this process by 
disrupting the investment climate could have a 
catastrophic global impact.
 • International terrorism. The jihad in Iraq is attrac-
ting followers from within the region and 
around the world, unsettling already unstable 
internal political dynamics throughout the 
region. Like the exodus of the jihadis from 
Afghanistan in the 1990s to conflict zones 
around the world, Iraq today constitutes the 
world’s proving ground for a new wave of 
Islamic extremists to develop their skills in 
igniting conflicts around the world.15 It is also 
clear that al-Qai’da is actively pursuing plans 
for a strategic attack on critical oil production 
facilities throughout the region—an event that 
could have an enormously damaging impact on 
global economic and political affairs.16
 • Proliferation of nuclear and other unconven- 
tional weapons. Iran’s apparently inexorable 
7march toward acquisition of nuclear weapons 
has been greeted with proclamations in regional 
capitals from Rabat to Muscat declaring an 
intent to develop their own nuclear power 
programs. Where once the region boasted only 
one nuclear power (Israel), a cascade of nuclear 
programs threatens a new and potentially 
destabilizing round of nuclear proliferation. 
Given the unstable intrastate and interstate 
dynamics, a nuclearized region is thus another 
of the disturbing alternative futures that might 
tempt the regional states.
Regional Instability and the New Security Dilemma.
 The World Economic Forum reports all note the 
threat posed by geopolitical instability in the Middle 
East to global security. That geopolitical instability 
flows from a discombobulated regional environment 
that is still rearranging itself in the aftermath of the 
Iraq invasion—the most important regional event 
since the Six-Day War in 1967. The Iraq war has altered 
the distribution of power throughout the region, with 
a number of critical external and internal elements 
pressuring regional governing elites:17
 • The perceived decline in U.S. global military power 
and political influence and a consequent loss of 
credibility in the American extended deterrent. 
The global decline in U.S. political influence 
is mirrored in the region—and has been 
particularly exacerbated by the Iraq invasion 
and its distraction from a more constructive 
involvement in the Arab-Israeli dispute.
 • The emergence of an alliance of powerful state and 
nonstate actors: Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, Hamas, 
8and various Shi’ite-based militias and political 
organizations in Iraq. Various of these actors 
have successfully portrayed themselves as 
representatives of a “successful” resistance 
movement opposed to Israel and the United 
States in Iraq, Lebanon, and the occupied 
territories. The new-found public legitimacy and 
popularity of these actors represent a profound 
challenge to the established ruling elites.
 • The Sunni state elites of the Eastern Mediterranean 
and Gulf states now confront an ascendant Iran-
dominated Shia bloc. As a result, they are 
scrambling to build a series of balancing political 
relationships to fill the vacuum created by the 
loss of U.S. influence and the necessity for them 
to distance themselves from Washington.
 • Iran’s so far successful defiance of the United States 
and the international community in its relentless 
movement toward acquiring a nuclear capability. 
Its achievement of nuclear status is one aspect 
of its enhanced regional power and influence 
in the aftermath of the Iraq invasion. Iran now 
arguably exercises a preponderant influence in 
Iraq—particularly in the south.
 • Strengthened Islamist political movements through-
out the region. These must now be accommoda-
ted by regional regimes.
 • Anxious regional oil producers. While still 
dependent on U.S. military protection, they 
are actively building political, economic, and 
military partnerships with outside powers such 
as India, China, Russia, and Pakistan.
 • Publics that are virulently anti-United States and 
anti-Israel. They increasingly see little distinction 
between the two.
9 Shorn of the protective security umbrella provided 
by U.S. guarantees and facing a restive, anti-U.S./Israel 
public, regional regimes simultaneously confront a 
threatening external environment consisting of an 
unstable Iraq, a potentially nuclear-armed Iran, and an 
Iranian-headed regional alliance of state and nonstate 
actors ranging from Baghdad to Beirut. Regional 
elites also see the prospect of an Iranian-allied state 
in Iraq after the United States inevitably departs and 
a proliferation of nonstate Shi’ite and Sunni militias 
develops, looking for other regional climes in which 
to ply their mischievous trade. The military prowess in 
asymmetric military operations shown by Hezbollah 
against Israel in Lebanon in August 2006 and similar 
military capabilities of various nonstate insurgent 
groups in Iraq provide a stark and threatening contrast 
to the traditional conventional military incompetence 
in the surrounding states. 
An Altered Regional Security Dilemma.
 The nature of the security dilemma for regional 
states has been changed owing to the altered distribu- 
tion of power—that critical underlying struc-
tural dynamic of interstate interactions and 
the engine driving the region’s geopolitical 
instability which so concern analysts at 
the World Economic Forum. The security dilemma 
refers to a concept employed by the international 
relations theory of realism, which views states as 
existing in an anarchical, self-help system where they 
are primarily motivated by self-interest.18 The modern 
form of realism, the so-called “neo-realist” paradigm 
developed by Kenneth Waltz, holds that actions taken 
by states to protect and enhance their security in turn 
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create insecurity for surrounding states that causes 
states to balance and counterbalance each other in a 
never-ending cycle.19 Under this theory, the security 
dilemma of states and the relative distribution of power 
in the international system form a structural dynamic 
that governs interstate interactions. States pursue 
security through a combination of arms buildups and 
political-military ties to other strong states in alliances. 
Pursuit of nuclear weapons—the  supposed ultimate 
guarantor of state security—and/or nuclear partners 
is explained under realist theory as a logical result 
of states’ quest for security. That quest for security is 
pursued by states’ political leadership using a rational 
decisionmaking process that apportions available 
resources to meet the security needs of the state. Waltz 
controversially argued in 1981 that these underlying 
dynamics of the international system would inevitably 
result in a world of many nuclear states. But Waltz also 
argued that nuclear proliferation would not necessarily 
lead to a more unstable international environment, 
since possession of nuclear weapons would make the 
costs of war catastrophically high for states and would 
thus naturally weight the decisionmaking cost-benefit 
analysis of leaders against war.20 
 Throughout the Middle East, the security dilemma 
of states has ebbed and flowed in ways that were 
predicted by the theory, albeit with some twists. The 
region has historically featured four regional hegemons: 
Israel, Egypt, Iraq, and Iran. Regional states have lived 
in an environment dominated by interstate conflict and 
rivalry, punctuated by violent outbreaks and warfare. 
As predicted by realism theory, the unstable regional 
environment created incentives for states to arm 
themselves through purchases of military equipment. 
Not surprisingly, the region has constituted the largest 
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market for conventional arms in the developing world 
over much of the last 25 years. Recent figures illustrate 
this trend. According to the Congressional Research 
Service, the Near East Region leads the developing 
world in arms purchases, with states signing arms 
contracts valued at $75.5 billion during the period 
from 1998 to 2005.21 However, to view arms purchases 
simply as a logical extension of state responses to 
their respective security dilemmas fills in  only part of 
the picture. Throughout the Middle East the security 
dilemma of regional states has always been more 
complicated than the realist paradigm would suggest, 
a complication attributable to the region’s changing 
geopolitical dynamics. 
 There is almost universal agreement that arms 
purchases throughout the region have not created 
credible conventional military capabilities. This is no 
accident. While Middle Eastern leaders historically 
spent lavishly on conventional arms, those arms 
were never primarily intended to provide credible 
conventional military capability to reduce external 
threats to state security. With the exception of Israel, the 
region’s conventional militaries historically have been 
noted more for their incompetence than their military 
prowess.22 The reason for this is that regional regimes 
were motivated by a more important consideration: the 
overriding domestic political imperative to keep their 
conventional militaries weak as a way to mitigate coup 
threats from their militaries.23 Instead of protecting 
regimes from external threats, arms purchases 
served as vehicles to co-opt potential internal regime 
opponents while simultaneously addressing a more 
important purpose of cementing political relations 
with outside powers. Saudi Arabia’s $65 billion  worth 
of military equipment purchased from the United 
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States under the foreign military sales program is the 
quintessential example of this regional phenomenon. 
Throughout the Middle East and Persian Gulf, state 
responses to external threats were systemically shaped 
by the contradictory objective of protecting themselves 
from internal threats as well as external adversaries. 
Regional regimes almost always chose to treat internal 
threats more seriously than external ones. One result 
of this calculation was that regional states lived in a 
perpetual military imbalance in relation to the regional 
hegemons.
 Regional states similarly failed to see the value 
in cooperation as a tool to manage their security 
dilemmas—cooperative behavior that should have 
logically followed from the neo-liberal paradigm.24 
The explanation for this failure also partially lies with 
the overriding salience of internal threats to regional 
regimes. Had the regimes acted in accordance with neo-
liberal theory to address their insecurity, they would 
have established a collective security framework as a 
vehicle to co-opt and balance the hegemons. During 
the 1980s, fractious interstate disputes and rivalries 
prevented Middle Eastern and Gulf states from creating 
effective political-military partnerships to address 
the systemic military imbalance created by the three 
regional hegemons. In the Eastern Mediterranean, 
the Arab League never became an institution capable 
of unifying the states against common threats. In the 
Gulf, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) created in 
1981 similarly failed to mobilize member states into an 
effective balancing mechanism to counter either Iran 
or Iraq. 
 Political scientist Gregory Gause argues that 
during the period 1971-91, the cost-benefit calculations 
driving decisionmaking on alliances in the Persian 
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Gulf were perceived ideological and political threats 
and not strictly military power.25 This calculus drove 
states into a complicated, dynamic series of interstate 
relationships that lacked foundation and which 
fluctuated according to regional circumstance. Despite 
the Gulf States’ service as loyal noncombatant allies to 
Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war, less than 2 years after 
the war ended, they found themselves on the receiving 
end of an ungrateful Saddam’s wrath. Interestingly, 
the most enduring regional partnership of the period 
has proved to be Iran’s alliance of convenience with the 
secular Baath regime in Syria. That partnership served 
as a means to further Iran’s objectives in Lebanon and 
helped consolidate Hezbollah’s capabilities as a tool to 
be used against Israel and the United States.
 As part of this complicated regional dynamic, most 
regional states simultaneously sought and received 
security guarantees from the United States (or the 
Soviet Union prior to 1989)—particularly after Gulf 
War I in 1991, developments that are consistent with 
the neo-realist paradigm. (While Jordan bucked the 
trend by aligning itself with Iraq during Gulf War I, it 
rectified the situation soon after the conclusion of that 
war.) These U.S. guarantees were embodied in a series 
of bilateral defense cooperation agreements throughout 
the region, embracing Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Bahrain, 
Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman. A series 
of similarly structured agreements built up over the 
years between the United States and Saudi Arabia 
formalized the security partnership between these 
two states. These agreements committed the United 
States to the defense of these countries, permitted U.S. 
use of host-nation military facilities, defined the legal 
status of U.S. military personnel deployed in their 
countries, made provisions for prepositioned military 
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equipment, and established a framework for arms sales 
and military exercises. During the 1990s, the United 
States built up a military infrastructure in the Gulf 
to underwrite these guarantees and implement the 
policy of dual containment. Under the agreements, the 
U.S. Navy enlarged and placed on a more permanent 
footing its headquarters elements in Manama, Bahrain, 
as did the Air Force in Qatar and the Army in Kuwait.
 With the exception of having to buy U.S. arms 
and bear some of the monetary costs associated with 
basing infrastructure, the security guarantees extended 
by the United States constituted politically cost-free 
arrangements for the regional states, allowing them 
to concentrate on their internal threats, regarded as 
more serious. The first overt signs that the terms and 
conditions surrounding the security guarantees were 
not as politically cost-free as the regimes had hoped 
first appeared in Saudi Arabia. Following attacks by 
Saudi dissidents on U.S. military facilities in 1995 and 
1996, domestic pressure began building on the regime 
to end the presence of American military personnel at 
Prince Sultan Air Base—pressure that finally resulted 
in the departure of U.S. operational forces from the 
Kingdom in 2003. In many respects, the House of Saud 
acted in ways that were consistent with the argument 
of this monograph—that internal threats and internal 
political dynamics played overriding shaping roles 
in the response of state leadership to their security 
dilemmas. In the case of Saudi Arabia, the removal of 
these U.S. forces and the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks 
have formed part of a more complicated political 
framework between Saudi Arabia and the United 
States that has undermined the nature of the security 
guarantees extended by the United States to Saudi 
Arabia dating back to the 1950s.26 
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 The historical root of the security dilemma of 
regional states is also reflected in their respective 
nuclear postures. A surprising feature of nuclear 
proliferation in the Middle East is the comparative 
restraint exercised by states for the last 50 years despite 
being at the center of the globe’s most persistent and 
enduring conflict and three major regional wars.27 
Regional states have lived under the threat of nuclear 
weapons at least since 1968, when it is believed that 
Israel achieved a nuclear capability.28 Other nearby 
states also boast nuclear weapons, with India having 
exploded a device in 1974 and Pakistan in 1987, yet 
these developments did not spur regional proliferation. 
While the realist paradigm might have predicted a 
virtual cascade of additional regional nuclear states in 
response to Israel’s nuclear program, none of Israel’s 
neighbors aggressively pursued nuclear weapons. 
In the region, Iraq, Iran and Libya pursued nuclear 
programs for their own purposes. Iraq’s program was 
disrupted by the Israeli strikes in September 1980 and 
then again in the inspection process following Gulf 
War I. Iran’s program, started under the Shah, now 
apparently boasts a well-developed infrastructure for 
uranium enrichment. Libya also pursued a nuclear 
program—albeit an ineffective one that never had a 
likelihood of success.29 
 The basis for regional nuclear restraint stemmed 
from the outsourcing of “strategic” security by states 
to outside powers as embodied in a series of cross-
cutting security guarantees extended by the United 
States and the Soviet Union that date to the 1950s-
1970s. During the Cold War, the United States and the 
Soviet Union carved up regional alliance blocs glued 
together by security guarantees that effectively placed 
much of the region under an extended deterrent 
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nuclear umbrella.30 As states exercised restraint in 
developing nuclear weapons, however, that restraint 
did not extend to the development of unconventional 
weapons. The period from 1970 to 2000 saw Syria, Iraq, 
and Iran all develop/acquire chemical and biological 
weapons and long-range missiles that were directed at 
a wide variety of regional adversaries. The presence of 
long-range missiles and chemical weapons is another 
disturbing feature of the regional military balance.
 All aspects of the new regional distribution 
of power have combined to create circumstances 
eliminating the incentives for states to show nuclear 
restraint while increasing the attractiveness of a more 
ambiguous nuclear posture. The altered distribution 
of power features external and internal dynamics that 
have combined to force leaders to address external 
threats in ways that are now inexorably being shaped 
by internal politics. Where before these two competing 
priorities could be pursued independently by regional 
elites, it is now no longer possible for states to keep 
the external and internal threats separated. This new 
dynamic is being shaped by a variety of forces. At the 
global level, there is a general perception that U.S. 
power and influence are on the wane. Polling data over 
the last 5 years reveal the steady erosion of popular 
support for the United States around the world—a 
critical factor limiting U.S. ability to exert global 
leadership.31 Reflecting this decline, states around the 
world, and most particularly those in the Middle East, 
confront significant domestic political costs to maintain 
a supportive relationship with the United States. This 
phenomenon is vividly on display in Iraq, in which 
no regional state has accepted a direct role in trying 
to stabilize the country. Far from demonstrating U.S. 
strength and power, the situation in Iraq is actually 
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undermining American might as well as the credibility 
of U.S. security guarantees that have been relied upon 
by Middle Eastern states as their primary instrument 
for protection against external adversaries. As noted 
earlier, the perceived decline in U.S. power has 
combined with a domestic political environment that 
is virulently anti-United States throughout the region.
The Security Dilemma and New Nuclear Dynamics.
 The region’s altered nuclear posture presents 
another disturbing feature of the regional security 
environment. In September 2006, Egyptian President 
Hosni Mubarak’s son (and presumed successor), 
Gamal, announced Egypt’s intentions to revive the 
dormant nuclear energy program abandoned in 1986. 
The ambitious plan is to build three nuclear power 
plants by 2020 that would generate 1,800 megawatts 
of electricity. The first of these plants is to be located 
in the city of Al-Dabah. The younger Mubarak’s 
announcement followed several forceful statements by 
the regime’s opponents calling for Egypt to develop 
its own deterrent nuclear weapon. For example, in 
July 2006, Dr. Hamdi Hassan, spokesman for the 
Muslim Brotherhood parliamentary caucus, stated: 
“We are ready to starve in order to own a nuclear 
weapon that will represent a real deterrent and will be 
decisive in the Arab-Israeli conflict.” Other prominent 
Muslim Brotherhood leaders have openly called for 
the development of nuclear weapons, ridiculing the 
Mubarak regime’s policy of trying to have the Middle 
East declared a WMD-free zone.32 Egypt currently 
operates two nuclear research reactors. Its newest 
reactor became operational in 1997, with construction 
and design assistance provided by the Argentinian 
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company, Investigacion Aplicada, or INVAP. Egypt is 
a Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) signatory. 
 In November 2006, Algeria announced intentions 
to expand its own nuclear energy program—an 
announcement immediately followed by an offer 
extended by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad 
to assist in Algeria’s program. Tehran faces stiff 
competition for the business. In January 2007, Russian 
Minister of Industry and Energy Viktor Khristenko 
visited Algiers, where he concluded an agreement to 
cooperate on developing nuclear energy. According to 
Khristenko: “We have agreed within the framework of 
the memorandum to begin contacts between experts in 
the two countries to study the possibilities of bilateral 
cooperation and to determine the areas of possible 
cooperation in this [nuclear] context, and I hope that 
we can begin this work soon.”33 Algeria also reportedly 
approached South Korea for nuclear cooperation in mid-
2006.34 Algeria has been operating two research reactors 
under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
supervision since the mid-1990s. INVAP provided a 
one-megawatt reactor that became operational in 1989; 
another reactor, provided by China and producing 15 
megawatts, is located at Ain Oussera in a remote area 
of the Atlas Mountains some 90 miles south of Algiers. 
Discovery of sophisticated surface-to-air missiles at 
the site in the early 1990s led to suspicions that Algeria 
was developing nuclear weapons at the site. Under 
pressure from the United States, Algeria acceded to the 
NPT and placed its facilities under IAEA safeguards in 
1992.35 
 Morocco first indicated its intention to expand 
its nuclear power program in April 2006—plans that 
received a boost during Russian President Vladimir 
Putin’s visit to Rabat in September 2006. During the 
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visit, a Russian spokesman indicated that Russia’s 
nuclear export agency, Atomstroiexport, would join in 
the bidding for Morocco’s first nuclear power station 
which Rabat hopes to become operational by 2016.36 
Morocco currently operates a small two-megawatt 
reactor provided by the United States under IAEA 
safeguards.
 Joining the cacophony of announcements, in 
December 2006 member states of the GCC announced 
plans to develop their own nuclear power programs 
under IAEA supervision.37 In early 2007, GCC 
Secretary General Abdul Rahman Al-Attyah indicated 
that preliminary plans call for the beginning of nuclear 
power plant construction by 2009, an ambitious 
timetable given the lack of a nuclear infrastructure in 
the Gulf. Saudi Foreign Minister Saudi al-Faisal told 
reporters: “It is not a threat. . . . It is an announcement 
so that there will be no misinterpretation of what 
we are doing. We are not doing this secretly. We are 
doing it openly.”38 Putin’s February 2007 visit to Saudi 
Arabia—the first-ever official visit by a Russian head of 
state to the Kingdom—signaled that the GCC and the 
Saudis would find a ready supplier for all their nuclear 
needs from Russia. Of the GCC member countries, 
only Saudi Arabia is known to have an active nuclear 
research program, and none are believed to have 
nuclear reactors. All are NPT signatories. 
 Finally, Jordan’s King Abdullah announced in 
January 2007 that Jordan would join its Arab neighbors 
in pursuing a nuclear power program. Following the 
announcement, a spokesman for Jordan’s Energy 
Ministry announced the formation of a committee to 
begin studies on the construction of a 600 megawatt 
reactor. Pakistan has publicly offered to assist in the 
development of Jordan’s program. The government’s 
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announcement received widespread praise from such 
diverse sources as the Jordanian Communist Party 
and the Islamic Action Party—the political arm of 
Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood.39 Like other regional 
states, Jordan promises to observe IAEA-administered 
safeguards. Moving to a more ambiguous nuclear 
stance reflects the altered security dilemma and 
addresses the new regional distribution of power by 
signaling different actors with a variety of different 
messages. Consider:
 • It reinforces the message to Tehran that regional 
states are not prepared to stand by idly and see 
a nuclear-armed and regionally-dominant Iran 
establish a coercive political-military frame-
work to intimidate the region. The region’s 
new nuclear posture must be seen as a hedged 
response to Iran.
 • It signals to outside powers such as Russia, 
China, and India that the era of U.S. regional 
hegemony is drawing to a close and that outside 
powers now have an opportunity to build 
political, military, and economic partnerships in 
which cooperation on nuclear programs can be 
one supportive element in a broader integrated 
relationship.
 • It sends a variety of messages to the United 
States: (1) the overriding importance of 
forestalling Iran’s march towards nuclear 
weapons and the potential consequences of not 
stopping Iran; (2) the region’s exasperation and 
displeasure with U.S. regional policy under 
the George W. Bush administration; (3) that it 
may not be possible to revert to the “business 
as usual” approach between Washington and 
regional capitals; (4) but Washington has time 
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to try to resolve these issues since it will be 5-7 
years or longer before these nuclear programs 
can be realistically established.
 • It demonstrates to domestic political constit-
uencies that the regimes are publicly distancing 
themselves from Washington and are no longer 
necessarily prepared either to accept a U.S. 
security guarantee or to exist under a threatening 
nuclear shadow emanating either from Tel Aviv 
or Tehran. The pursuit of nuclear programs has 
the potential to become an important symbol of 
national identity and prestige throughout the 
region.
 • Moving to a latent nuclear status signals to Israel 
that the region will be able to achieve nuclear 
capability on short notice, representing an end 
to Israel’s regional nuclear monopoly.
 • Administering their nuclear programs under 
IAEA supervision allows the regional states to 
cloak their programs in an aura of legitimacy, 
which means they can continue to use Israel’s 
and Iran’s continued noncompliance with 
the NPT to their political advantage in the 
international arena.
Unstable Internal Political Dynamics.
 The altered regional security dilemma and the 
region’s changing nuclear posture must be framed in 
the context of changing internal political dynamics—
another of the structural features leading to regional 
geopolitical instability. The unfolding Hamas-
Palestinian Authority conflict in the Occupied Territor-
ies provides an apt metaphor for the broader internal 
power struggles unfolding across the region in which 
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the discredited ruling elites are searching for a formula 
to accommodate the rising power of the Islamists 
while preserving their own hold on power. Upsetting 
the apple cart of long-established Iraqi politics comes 
during a time of regional generational transition, 
with the carcasses of anachronistic and discredited 
secular dictatorships and monarchies still littering the 
regional political landscape. Egyptian President Hosni 
Mubarak is positioning his son, Gamal, to succeed him. 
Syrian President Haffez Assad’s son, Bashar, already 
sits perched atop a creaky Alawite power structure. In 
Jordan, King Abdullah faces the daunting prospect of 
governing without the popularity and legitimacy of his 
father. In Bahrain, Sheikh Hamad proclaimed himself 
king in an attempt to ensure that the Khalifa dynasty 
continues in perpetuity its rule over the island’s restive 
Shi’ite majority. In Saudi Arabia, King Abdullah 
recently decreed that succession would be dealt with 
by an internal committee and that power would not 
necessarily pass directly to the next-in-line figure in 
the succession hierarchy. In Kuwait, succession in the 
Sabah family was handled with the constructive input 
of an increasingly assertive Kuwaiti parliament.
 The Iraq venture has reopened simmering 
internal sectarian fissures that had for the most part 
lain dormant during the 1990s and the era of U.S. 
containment in the Gulf. Political empowerment of 
Shi’ites and Kurds in Iraq will have lasting implications 
in the region by reigniting political aspirations within 
both groups across national borders. Kurds in Iran 
and Turkey are already feeling the pull of the de facto 
Kurdish state currently emerging in northern Iraq. 
The armed Peshmerga today police the borders of the 
new Kurdistan, and the Kurds now have access to a 
portion of oil revenues coming out of the fields near 
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Kirkuk and Mosul. It is estimated that oil reserves in 
northern Iraq total 48 billion barrels, with another 100 
trillion cubic feet of natural gas. The Kurdish Regional 
Government (KRG) has already signed production 
sharing agreements with Norwegian and Turkish 
companies that are actively exploring for new wells in 
the Kurdish areas.40 The KRG is treading delicately in 
its relationship with the Iraqi government in Baghdad, 
but there is little doubt around the region that in 
political terms the removal of Saddam has led to the 
Kurds finally achieving their centuries-old dreams 
of achieving political autonomy. A Kurdish state in 
northern Iraq would represent a potential threat to Iran 
as well as Turkey, with both having sizable Kurdish 
populations. In July 2004, Iran and Turkey signed an 
agreement to cooperate on security matters relating to 
Kurdish separatist groups operating out of northern 
Iran. The agreement to cooperate against Kurdish 
groups comes amidst a growing Turkish-Iranian 
relationship that features the possible export of Iranian 
natural gas through Turkey to Europe.41
 Political empowerment of the Shi’ite majority 
in Iraq following Saddam’s removal is also stirring 
Shi’ite political aspirations throughout the Gulf, where 
they form the majority in Iran and Bahrain, with 
significant minorities in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and 
Lebanon.42 In December 2004, Jordan’s King Abdullah 
voiced the concerns of the region’s Sunni leaders when 
he warned of the possibility of a dominant Shi’ite 
crescent stretching from Iran through Iraq and Syria 
and into Lebanon.43 The removal of Saddam is reviving 
the region’s age-old religious rivalry between Shias and 
Sunnis stretching back over the centuries. The triumph 
of the Baathists in Iraq during the 1960s and their rule 
the next 40 years formed a critical component in the 
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Sunni states’ plans to keep Shi’ite influence bottled 
up in Iran, giving them a free hand to manage their 
own Shi’ite minorities. The model of Iraq’s inchoate 
democracy, which has given the majority Shias political 
power, resonates powerfully within significant Shi’ite 
communities in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon.44 
Pilgrimages to the recently opened Shi’ite shrines 
in Najaf and Karbala have also invigorated the 
transnational sense of Shi’ite religious identity and 
community that Saddam and the Sunni monarchies 
had long suppressed.45 
New Political and Military Actors.
 Empowerment of the Shi’ite communities and the 
increased pressure on the Sunni-led states also comes 
at a time when a new caste of populist political leaders 
and Islamist-dominated associations is emerging 
region-wide to challenge the religious, age-based, and 
familial hierarchies that dominate regional politics. 
This region-wide challenge provides another of the 
underlying structural features of the geopolitical 
instability so feared by the World Economic Forum. 
Leaders like Hassan Nasrallah in Lebanon, Ismail 
Haniyeh in Gaza, and Muqtada al-Sadr in Iraq are 
the vanguard of new political and anti-democratic 
movements that are exerting authority through skillful 
grass roots politics backed by the point of a gun. These 
leaders are positioning themselves as alternatives to 
the familial and sectarian hierarchies that seized power 
with the departure of the colonial occupiers some 50 
years ago. 
 Importantly, below these visible figures are a 
variety of vibrant political associations in Jordan, 
Kuwait, Bahrain, and Yemen that are all mobilizing 
to exert power in the nascent democratic processes 
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unfolding in these states. In Saudi Arabia, a group 
of once-dissident clerics has been readmitted to 
mainstream society and actively participated in that 
country’s municipal elections in early 2003.46 Fiery 
anti-U.S. clerics like Saffar al-Hawali have been 
permitted to join the process of political mobilization 
in the elections, which only confirmed the popularity 
of the religious conservatives at the local political level. 
 Reflecting the Kingdom’s changing domestic 
political landscape, the regime in November 2004 
allowed a group of clerics (including Hawali) to issue 
a fatwa urging support for jihadist forces inside Iraq. 
Region-wide political mobilization is being reinforced 
by the aftermath of the Iraq invasion, in which a variety 
of new actors are combining impressive organizational 
skills with Islamist and populist political rhetoric that 
melds Islamist political themes and historical narratives 
featuring resistance to traditional powers and sources 
of authority and a call to re-Islamize society. 
 An important complementary factor accompanying 
the emergence of new political forces is the arrival of 
a new generation of conventional weapons that allows 
nonstate groups to establish so-called states-within-
states and to challenge established conventional 
military forces in the region. Shi’ite organizations 
like Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Mahdi army in 
Sadr City are recent examples of this phenomenon. 
Both organizations have established states-within-
states in their respective areas, combining political 
and military tools to exercise control. As Israeli and 
U.S. military forces have discovered much to their 
discomfort, increasingly lethal weapons like the 
RPG-29, antiship cruise missiles, advanced sniper 
rifles, remote piloted vehicles loaded with explosives, 
and new surface-to-surface rockets have provided 
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insurgent and militia groups with dangerous new 
killing power. The U.S. Central Command’s General 
John Abizaid told reporters in September 2006 that the 
new weapons provide an unwelcome “hint of things 
to come” in the already-deadly military landscape.47 
Abizaid notes the intraregional cooperation between 
a variety of different groups that are spreading 
weapons throughout the region: “There are clearly 
links between Lebanese Hezbollah training people in 
Iran to operate in Lebanon, and also training people 
in Iran that are Shia splinter groups that could operate 
against us in Iraq.”48 There have long been suspicions 
that Iran’s Revolutionary Guards have been assisting 
insurgents and Shi’ite militias in fielding ever-more 
deadly shaped-charge improvised explosive devices 
that are exacting a growing toll on the road-bound U.S. 
military in Iraq.49 U.S. M1A2 main battle tanks, Marine 
Corps Amphibious Assault Vehicles, British armored 
personnel carriers, and Israeli Merkava battle tanks 
have been destroyed by explosively formed projectiles 
and RPG-29s in the last 36 months.
 The new generation of conventional weapons 
proved critical to Hezbollah’s successful resistance 
against Israel’s overwhelming conventional military 
power in Lebanon in August 2006. Hezbollah’s 
organizational structure, featuring a decentralized 
command and control network with competent and 
innovative unit commanders, successfully executed 
a defense in depth that countered Israeli mounted 
infantry and armor and even successfully struck an 
Israeli naval vessel. 50 Iraqi insurgents are also using 
similar asymmetric tactics against U.S. forces in Iraq, 
and many believe it is only a matter of time before the 
Shi’ite militias start to see their military capabilities 
grow with the new advanced weaponry.
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 This upsurge in regional military capabilities 
coincides with revelations that Russia has apparently 
abandoned its policy of restraining conventional arms 
transfers to Iran and developing nations around the 
world. According to the authoritative Congressional 
Research Service: “In recent years, Russian leaders 
have made major strides in providing more creative 
financing and payment options for prospective arms 
clients. They have also agreed to engage in counter-
trade, offsets, debt-swapping, and, in key cases, . . . 
licensed production agreements in order to sell its 
weapons.”51 Many of the new weapons in Hezbollah’s 
arsenal, e.g., the RPG-29, are believed to have been 
originally sold by Russia or are being produced under 
license in Iran, which provided these weapons to its 
terrorist clients in Iraq and Lebanon.
  This weaponry, combined with appropriate train-
ing and organizational skills, provides nonstate actors 
like the Mahdi army and Hezbollah with the ability to 
threaten all the conventional militaries of the region. 
Hezbollah has established effective local control 
throughout much of southern Lebanon, and Shi’ite 
militias have similarly established control over much 
of Baghdad and southern Iraq. In both these cases, it 
is not clear whether the central government authority 
has the military capability to reassert control over these 
areas. For the Sunni-led states in the Gulf and Eastern 
Mediterranean, this is particularly troubling, given 
the history of conventional military incompetence 
throughout these states. The new military power 
accruing to actors like Hezbollah provides them with 
new bargaining leverage over internal political rivals 
as well as the surrounding regional states.
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Iranian Ascendance.
 The regional environment in the aftermath of the 
Iraq invasion suits Iranian interests and objectives—
another feature driving the region’s geopolitical 
instability. Iran’s historical objective of becoming the 
dominant regional political and military power has 
been realized. A comfortable political and military 
partnership appears to be emerging between the Shi’ite 
power structure in Najaf and Karabla with the mullahs 
in Tehran. The U.S. military occupation of Iraq and 
the ongoing insurgency serve Iran’s purposes in two 
ways. First, it ties down the United States militarily 
and reduces the coercive and deterrent leverage from 
its forward deployed forces. Instead of demonstrating 
U.S. resolve and strength as the neoconservatives 
had hoped, Iraq is demonstrating the limits of U.S. 
power and emboldening its adversaries. Second, the 
slow bleed of U.S. influence and military power in 
Iraq makes it more difficult for the United States to 
muster the political and military resources necessary 
to credibly threaten what looks like Iran’s acquisition 
of a nuclear capability. Instead, the United States is 
forced to recognize Iran’s dominant position. Iran now 
holds the keys to Iraq’s future, not the United States. 
Iran is the new champion of regional political causes 
like the Arab-Israeli dispute. Where once Nasser and 
Saddam were the main attraction, today pictures 
of Iranian President Ahmadinejad and Hezbollah’s 
Hassan Nasrallah dominate the souks of the Middle 
East. 
 Iran’s regional ascendance is aided by U.S. re-
gional missteps outside Iraq. The Iraq occupation in 
conjunction with the diminished U.S. effort to solve 
the Arab-Israeli dispute has dramatically reduced U.S. 
political influence throughout the region. All public 
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opinion polls in the region taken over the last several 
years reveal that popular support for the United States 
has all but disappeared. Reflecting the widespread 
frustration with the United States, an exasperated 
Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal told reporters in 
September 2005: “We fought a war together to keep 
Iran out of Iraq after Iraq was driven out of Kuwait. 
. . . Now we are handing the whole country over to Iran 
without reason.”52 
Security Strategy and Regional Threats. 
 The United States thus confronts the altered 
regional security environment with a strategy that 
remains rooted in its Cold War experience that featured 
collective defense arrangements backed by security 
guarantees, forward military presence, and strong 
U.S.–host nation military relations. These Cold War 
relations saw the United States establish a military 
infrastructure around the world to support global 
operations. In the Persian Gulf and Middle East, the 
development of the infrastructure received particular 
momentum after the ejection of Saddam from Kuwait 
in 1991, which saw the development of basing facilities 
in Bahrain, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, 
and Saudi Arabia. 
 The American forward-deployed military presence 
in the Gulf has in the past served as an important 
instrument for preserving regional security and 
stability. Midway through the 1990s, the United States 
had successfully prepositioned three heavy brigade 
sets of military equipment in the region that formed 
the leading edge of the ground component that could 
be joined with air assets already in theater to counter 
conventional military threats to the peninsula. During 
the 1990s, the network of military facilities in Kuwait, 
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Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Oman allowed the United 
States to enforce the sanctions against Saddam. The 
infrastructure also represented the literal representation 
of the security umbrella spread by the United States 
over the Sunni monarchies of the Arabian Peninsula. By 
the end of the late 1990s, the infrastructure comprised 
the following main components:
 • Central Command Naval Component, or NAV-
CENT, in Manama, Bahrain;
 • Air Force Central Command Component, first 
at Eskan Village in Saudi Arabia before moving 
to Prince Sultan Air Base and then to Al Udeid 
in Qatar in August 2003;
 • Army Central Command Component, Kuwait;
 • Heavy Brigade sets of ground equipment in 
Qatar and Kuwait, and afloat;
 • Harvest Falcon Air Force equipment at Seeb in 
Oman;
 • Aerial refueling detachment at Al Dhafra in the 
United Arab Emirates.
 During the late 1990s, the digital revolution’s 
benefits began seeping into U.S. military operations 
throughout the world. Under the rubric of the so-
called revolution in military affairs, digitized pictures 
of the land, sea, and air environments were piped into 
American military bases and those of their coalition 
partners. The creation of common operating pictures 
helped create transparency and enhanced situational 
awareness to coalition militaries throughout the Gulf. 
By the time of Gulf War II, the network had enlarged 
with the addition of a veritable alphabet soup of new 
command elements, organizations, and operational 
nodes: 
 • Combined Forces Command Afghanistan 
(CFC-A) in Kabul that works with NATO’s 
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International Security Assistance Force.
 • Also in Afghanistan, the Combined Joint 
Task Force 76 that directs combat operations 
throughout Afghanistan.
 • Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa 
in Djibouti (CJTF-HOA), which is assisting 
countries in the region to build indigenous 
counterterrorist capabilities.
 • Combined Joint Task Force 150, a coalition 
maritime naval assemblage commanded by a 
revolving series of multinational officers out of 
Manama that includes nine ships from seven 
countries performing maritime security in the 
Red Sea and Indian Ocean.
 • Combined Forces Air Component Command’s 
Combined Air Operations Center at Al 
Udeid, Qatar. This constitutes the Air Force’s 
Central Command forward-deployed theater 
component.
 • Central Command Forward Headquarters 
(CENTCOM-CFC), Camp As Saylihyah, Qatar, 
serving as the leading edge of headquarters 
elements based at Central Command’s head-
quarters at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. 
 • Central Command Special Operations Head-
quarters (SOCCENT), Qatar, which coordinates 
special operations in theater.
 • Multi-National Forces Iraq (MNF-I), overseeing 
all combat operations in Iraq.
 • Multi-National Security Training Command 
(MNSTC-I) that coordinates the program to 
train and equip Iraqi forces.
 • NATO Training Mission that focuses on devel-
oping the Iraqi officer corps.
 • Coalition Forces Land Component Command 
(CFLCC), Kuwait, constituting the Army’s 
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Central Command component that coordinates 
Army activity throughout the Central Command 
area of responsibility. CFLCC also maintains 
an area support group, or ASG, at Camp As 
Sayliyah in Qatar.
 • Central Command Deployment and Distribution 
Center (CDDOC), Kuwait, that supports theater-
wide logistics and information distribution.
 • Information, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 
launch and recovery facility at Al Dhafra Air 
Base in the United Arab Emirates. This facility 
provides the Air Force Central Command 
Component with an operational and logistics 
hub to support theater-wide intelligence sur-
veillance and collection with a variety of col-
lection platforms.53
 • In October 2004, as part of supplemental 
appropriations to fund ongoing operations in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, Congress earmarked 
$63 million in military construction funds for 
improvements at the Al Dhafra airfield in the 
United Arab Emirates, which accommodated 
a U.S. Air Force aerial refueling detachment 
during the 1990s and now hosts an information, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance launch and 
recovery facility. The same bill contained $60 
million to fund additional enhancements to the 
Al Udeid airfield in Qatar.
 • In Afghanistan, the United States is spending 
$83 million to upgrade its two main bases at 
Bagram Air Base (north of Kabul) and Kandahar 
Air Field to the south.54 The funding will be used 
to expand runways and other improvements to 
provide new billeting facilities for U.S. military 
personnel. 
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 • The expansion of the facilities infrastructure 
in Afghanistan has been mirrored by the 
development of facilities and solidified politico-
military partnerships in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, 
and Kazakhstan.55
 • In early 2006, Congress approved $413.4 million 
for Army military construction projects in Iraq 
and Afghanistan through 2010. The same bill 
funded $36 million for Air Force construction 
projects in these countries.
 • In Iraq, the United States so far has spent an 
estimated $240 million on construction at the 
Balad base (north of Baghdad), the main air 
transportation and supply hub; $46.3 million 
at Al Asad, the largest military air center and 
major supply base for troops in Al Anbar; and 
$121 million at Tallil air base (southern Iraq). 
Other projects include $49.6 million for Camp 
Taji located just 20 miles northwest of Baghdad; 
$165 million to build an Iraqi Army base near the 
southern town of Numaiy; and $150 million for 
the Iraqi Army Al Kasik base north of Mosul.56 
 The issue facing DoD defense planners today 
is the relevance of the network of Gulf and Central 
Asian facilities to the regional security environment. 
The extensive facilities infrastructure was built on 
the premise that the United States needs to perform a 
variety of political and military missions on behalf of its 
own interests: (1) insert large numbers of conventional 
forces into the region as defense against external threats; 
(2) address regional contingencies on short notice with 
forward-deployed forces using special operations forces 
and weapons platforms capable of standoff precision 
strikes; and (3) deter outside powers from threatening 
the region with military forces or using those forces 
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to create a coercive political environment exercising 
a destabilizing influence. For the regional elites, the 
facilities are intended to: (1) protect them from coercive 
external threats; and (2) remind internal opponents of 
the regime’s powerful friends. While the dynamics 
of these expectations have always been somewhat 
contradictory, the aftermath of the Iraq invasion has 
created a political environment in which it is dangerous 
for the regional elites to be seen as publicly tied and 
beholden to the United States. This environment raises 
doubts over whether the United States can realistically 
expect to use the facilities infrastructure to perform its 
two primary missions on behalf of the regional elites 
for the foreseeable future.57 
 A test case for the United States emerged in early 
2007 as a result of the unfolding crisis over Iran’s 
nuclear program and rumors of U.S. military plans for 
an extended bombardment of Iran’s nuclear sites.58 The 
military infrastructure in the Gulf would be critical for 
mounting any sustained operations to destroy Iran’s 
nuclear facilities that are reportedly widely dispersed, 
and deep underground in some cases, throughout the 
country. In early 2007, it remained unclear whether 
the Gulf States would allow the use of facilities on 
their soil to support U.S. military strikes against 
Iranian nuclear facilities. Qatari First Deputy Premier 
and Foreign Minister Sheikh Hamad bin Jassem bin 
Jabor Al Thani told reporters in March 2007 that “we 
will not participate by any means to harm Iran from 
Qatar,” though he refused to indicate whether Qatar 
was effectively vetoing the use of Al Udied Air Base or 
the Central Command’s headquarters in any Iranian 
operations. 
 It remains to be seen whether and how the Gulf 
States will deal with their ambivalence over the U.S. 
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military footprint. The regimes fear the prospect of a 
politically ascendant and potentially nuclear-armed 
Iran, but see the U.S. military presence as a powerful 
tool for resisting Iranian attempts to install a coercive 
political framework throughout the region. But the 
regimes equally fear the creation of domestic political 
dynamics that are increasingly hostile to the United 
States and which force them to publicly distance 
themselves from their erstwhile protector. Some of the 
region’s elites are better positioned to resist internal 
political pressures than others. The al Nahyans in the 
United Arab Emirates, for example, face no serious 
opposition or internal political pressure to reduce their 
ties with the United States. Hence, the U.S. operations 
at Al Dhafra Air Base apparently remain safe for the 
time being. But in other Gulf States, such as Bahrain 
and Kuwait, changing internal political dynamics may 
force the regimes to start pressuring the United States 
to reduce the military footprint. The linchpin for the 
regional base structure is in Iraq, where the United 
States has invested hundreds of millions of dollars 
in new military facilities. Given what is an untenable 
long-term military situation, it appears inevitable that 
a phased U.S. withdrawal will come in the next several 
years, possibly even sooner, as coerced by the Iraqis 
and domestic public opinion in the United States. It is 
unclear whether any Iraqi government will acquiesce 
to a long-term, foreign military presence on the new 
bases being built at Balad and elsewhere. 
 The political-military disconnect, it must be said, 
also exists in the United States. The quiescent domestic 
political environment of the 1990s that permitted the 
United States to build its regional military infrastructure 
has been transformed by the Iraq War and the so-
called war on terrorism. U.S. political relationships 
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with the Gulf State elites that had been maintained 
on a low key and with little fanfare during the 1990s 
are being subjected to new scrutiny in the press and in 
Congress.
A Way Forward.
 To mitigate threats to regional security, the United 
States must first come to grips with the linkages between 
the intrastate, interstate, and global environments in 
the region. With the linkages established, the threats to 
regional security and stability as identified in the Davos 
Forum’s formulation make perfect sense: geopolitical 
instability, energy supply disruptions, weapons 
proliferation, and international terrorism. In countering 
these threats, the United States must reconnect 
its security strategy to the regional environment, 
recognizing that it cannot simply apply “capabilities 
portfolios” to complex political and military problems 
bounded by the history and regional circumstances. 
The analysis presented here suggests that state 
behavior in the region is the product of an altered 
security dilemma, in which internal political pressures 
are forcing regional states away from outsourcing 
their strategic security to external powers and instead 
toward credibly addressing threats to external security 
themselves.
 The United States needs to undertake a strategic 
regional net assessment that examines the following 
issues as it seeks to construct a regional security strategy 
both to protect its interests and to mitigate wider 
threats to international security. That net assessment 
should include analysis of the following issues:
 • The role that security guarantees extended 
by the United States can still play as part of a 
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framework of regional security. Today, these 
security guarantees are manifested through 
forward military presence, joint training and 
military exercises, annual bilateral meetings 
devoted to security issues, sales of defense 
equipment, and continued development of 
the host-country facilities infrastructure. This 
Cold War template has had a remarkably 
successful track record around the world in 
protecting American interests and working 
with host nations in ways that preserve regional 
security and stability. It is clear that security 
guarantees can play an important role as part 
of the framework of regional security to reduce 
the prospects of interstate warfare, nuclear 
proliferation, and the threat of coercive political 
pressures from a regional hegemon. These 
steps in and of themselves help create a stable 
environment that will minimize the chances 
of disruptions in energy supplies. The United 
States and its host-nation partners need to 
determine whether this template can continue 
to be applied in the same way.
 • In addressing this template, the United States 
and its regional partners must reckon with the 
contradictions between the threats to stability 
posed by intranational and interstate tensions. 
A coherent regional security strategy must 
balance both aspects of the threat environment. 
It remains unclear whether the United States 
and its regional partners can square this circle, 
since the current template of regional security is 
primarily designed to counter interstate coercive 
threats while secondarily intimidating internal 
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regime opponents. A region-wide consultative 
process must be established that addresses 
these issues to determine how best to structure 
security relationship in ways that manage the 
tension between external and internal threats.
 • Finally, it is time for the United States to 
confront the impact that its bureaucratic and 
political obsession with force protection has had 
on its ability to embrace and integrate with host 
nation populations. The United States today 
has constructed a series of fortified enclaves 
throughout the Persian Gulf and Middle East 
that make it increasingly difficult to conduct 
business with host nations on an ongoing basis 
while keeping its finger on the pulse of the local 
populace. These American fortresses isolate our 
diplomats and military professionals from the 
environments in which they must operate and 
make it more difficult to integrate effectively 
into the local communities. While tearing down 
the walls of these stockades opens up these 
facilities and their personnel to terrorist attacks, 
remaining behind these walls in subterranean air 
con-ditioned vaults imposes other and equally 
dam-aging long-term costs on the United States 
and its ability to implement a more dynamic 
security strategy.
Conclusion.
 The U.S. invasion of Iraq is reordering the regional 
balance of power in ways that make the threat 
environment more dynamic and unpredictable. Iran 
is taking advantage of the environment to position 
itself as the dominant regional power, i.e., moving 
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into the vacuum created by instability in Iraq and  the 
weakening U.S. regional position. The aftermath of the 
Iraq War is creating a new security dilemma for the 
regional ruling elites, who can no longer outsource 
their strategic security to the United States. This 
dilemma has forced the regimes into embracing a 
changed nuclear posture as seen in their response to 
Iran’s rise and their own domestic opposition to the 
United States. In dealing with this security dilemma, 
the regional elites must at the same time confront the 
rising power of Islamist political movements with 
reduced maneuvering room. 
 For its part, the United States is faced with 
maintaining its Cold War era regional military 
infrastructure that addresses external threats to 
security but which complicates the ability of the 
regimes to address internal political issues. During the 
1990s, containing Iraq in the air and at sea provided 
a convenient and supportable rationale for both the 
ruling elites and the United States to maintain this 
infrastructure. The Iraq war has changed this rationale 
for all parties concerned. While the United States now 
increasingly casts its presence in the context of the war 
on terror—this approach lacks strategic resonance and 
is not widely supported by regional publics.
 Similarly, the overwhelmingly negative U.S. do-
mestic public reaction to the Iraq War promises to 
diminish the willingness of future administrations 
to support an open-ended military commitment in 
the Persian Gulf and the Middle East—commitments 
manifested mainly through a forward military 
presence. These political uncertainties aside, however, 
the risks to global security emanating from the region 
demand that strategists adopt an integrated, long-
term approach to address the region’s geopolitical 
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instability. This may mean that the United States will 
have to return to a posture based more on an over-the-
horizon naval and air presence to give regional elites 
the political breathing space they need to manage their 
dynamic intrastate environments and allow the roiling 
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